银行和微型银行外文翻译资料

银行和微型银行

原文作者：罗伯特卡尔、阿斯利、乔纳森

摘要

作者使用两个新的数据集，检查是否存在影响银行的盈利能力和小额信贷机构的宣传。他们发现的证据表明，竞争的问题。在整体经济更大的银行的渗透与小额贷款银行推向贫穷市场相关的，反映在较小的平均贷款规模和更大的向妇女宣传。证据是特别强的依靠商业资金和使用传统的双边贷款合同的小额贷款银行（而不是团体贷款方法通过小额信贷非政府组织的青睐）。分析认为，相关的可能替代的解释，包括贯穿监管环境和金融环境的结构性质关系；但未能找到这些替代假说的有力支持。

一 简介

在2003年12月银行监管机构预测在每170万孟加拉国的公民中有一个ATM机器，在每2.2万玻利维亚人中有一个存款银行。孟加拉国和玻利维亚以早期的小微银行网点首先生根并快速发展而著名。是不是缺乏银行系统的帮助，导致金融深化不足呢？本文是第一次尝试衡量形式的存在，监管的金融服务供应商在一个经济影响盈利能力和金融机构定向狭窄到欠开户和银行账户的拓展。

小额信贷银行（“小额贷款银行”）的目标是低收入社区，不需要抵押品（或是比大多数主流商业银行所需的贷款抵押品的种类更灵活）。他们微小不是因为他们的机构规模，而是由于与客户的典型交易模式。贷款金额范围从100美元到5000美元不等，随着经营规模的变化从几百到几百万客户。最著名的微型银行，乡村银行，为几乎8百万孟加拉国客户提供服务，以及平均贷款余额79美元在2007年。如果快速增长的小额信贷银行证明不了什么，那么大量低收入借款人达到非常高的收入水平就很有说服力。数十亿美元的贷款，超过一亿的借款人是优秀的，从大银行的数据显示，只有2-3 %的人在最近几年是违法的。

小额信贷的产业组织和更广泛的银行业到目前为止很少受到关注，但作为中央银行设置阶段为“包容”银行业务的快速扩张，成为了解如何努力达到低收入和排斥的人群与大的经济和金融环境所必须的。交易规模小，意味着小额贷款银行往往被主流商业银行的操作排斥在外，尽管竞争是新兴的，尤其是小额信贷的逐渐商业化。经济理论表明，一个更为发达的银行业既能帮助又会阻碍小额贷款银行的盈利能力。平衡很大程度上取决于集聚效应的潜在容量和更强的监管环境与负面溢出效应所产生的竞争破坏了动态激励在小额贷款合同的根本相对优势。确定平衡最终是一个经验问题。我们的研究结果表明，微型银行在同正规金融业竞争中的影响最强的因素是小额贷款银行对小额服务和市场的天性，而不是他们的盈利能力。竞争中出现的小额贷款银行对其驱动小规模贷款的壁垒（表明较差的客户）比其他情况下更加显著。

在某种程度上讲，竞争已经不在是由于数据的缺乏，而是关于接触形式的金融服务提供商和小额信贷机构自己的推广性能。最近在这两个方面的改进，使我们能够进行数据分析。我们建立在Beck，Demirguc-Kunt，和马丁内兹Peria（2007）包含99个国家，由银行监管机构提供的汇总数据，银行业拓展指标。

我们增加银行分支机构的数量，自动取款机的措施，贷款和存款账户补充的深度与金融体系效率的标准指标，如私人信贷占GDP的比率和净利润。我们表明，增加银行外延措施与盈利能力和小额信贷机构明显相关。而其他的银行业发展和效率的措施则不然。

我们的主要目标是对盈利能力和小额信贷机构的外延提供有影响力的证据。通过对小额信贷提供者提供的新的数据集与另一银行的推广性能的一个对比，我们也希望作出更多的贡献来探究竞争如何影响金融服务渠道，尤其是穷人。本文的其余部分组织如下。2部分介绍了最近关于金融机构之间的竞争研究。在3节中我们描述我们的数据，奠定了基本的回归方程，并讨论了我们的假设。在4节中我们提出了对于银行渗透措施和小额信贷的结果之间的关系与其他标准的措施之间的金融发展和小额信贷绩效的基础比较。然后我们通过比较高的小额信贷机构的特点和银行的低渗透区，并讨论银行渗透措施的外生性。第5部分是建立在试图确定小额信贷机构的类型的结果的基础上，我们发现银行间的渗透和小额信贷的推广和盈利能力。

相对于非政府组织，商业化的小额贷款银行往往使更多的贷款和服务被女性客户所分享。但我们发现，随着大银行的渗透，商业化的小额贷款银行开始推向更深的穷人的宣传。

6节探讨竞争的解释和因果关系要求的坚固性。针对年长的小额信贷机构的子集选择问题的第一中心（那些生存在1996之前）。由于银行的进入实质部分在发展中国家在最近几年，1995之后，这是合理的，这类机构是最有可能受到影响的竞争。较强的结果为该子集可以被看作是对的概念，竞争与银行对小额信贷的结果的因果效应。较弱的结果表明，我们的基础结果是被新进入者驱动的小额信贷。这可能表明，选择因素所驱动的小额信贷机构性能独特的轮廓定位在更大的银行存在的地区，但这些银行的竞争没有因果联系的结果。然后我们求助于银行所有制类型的潜在角色（外国），银行业的集中度，小额信贷的监管和规则。如上所述，有合理的理由相信我们的银行渗透变量结果反映了银行业结构和激励机制所带来的监管而不是竞争方面，但数据并不支持这一结论。对于读者来说，仍然担心银行分支的发展可能是盈利和小额信贷机构服务的来源，我们提供的工具变量回归在7节结束语出现，并包括在8节的标记部分。

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Banks and Microbanks

Robert Cull

Asli Demirguuml;ccedil;-Kunt

Jonathan Morduch

Abstract

Using two new datasets, the authors examine whether the presence of banks affects the profitability and outreach of microfinance institutions. They find evidence that competition matters. Greater bank penetration in the overall economy is associated with microbanks pushing toward poorer markets, as reflected in smaller average loans sizes and greater outreach to women. The evidence is particularly strong for microbanks relying on commercial funding and using traditional bilateral lending contracts (rather than the group lending methods favored by microfinance nongovernmental organizations).The analysis considers plausible alternative explanations for the correlations, including relationships that run through the nature of the regulatory environment and the structure of the banking environment; but it fails to find strong support for these alternative hypotheses.

Introduction

In December 2003, bank regulators estimated that there was one ATM in Bangladesh for every 1.7 million citizens, and one deposit-taking bank branch for every 22,000 people.1In Bolivia, there was one ATM for every 21,000 people, and just one deposit-taking bank branch for every 65,000 people. Bangladesh and Bolivia, though, are notable as early sites in which microfinance first took root and grew rapidly. Was the lack of financial depth in the banking system a help or a hindrance to icrofinance? This paper is a first attempt to gauge how the presence of formal, regulated providers of financial services in an economy affects the profitability and outreach of financial institutions targeted narrowly to the under-banked and unbanked.

Microfinance banks (“microbanks”) target low-income communities, and most make loans without requiring collateral (or are far more flexible than most ainstream commercial banks about the kinds of collateral required to secure loans). They are micro not because of their institutional scale but because of the scale of typical transactions with customers. Loan sizes range from under $100 to roughly $5000, and operational scale varies from several hundred customers to several million. The most famous microbank, Grameen Bank, serves nearly 8 million customers in Bangladesh with an average loan balance of $79in 2007.2 If the growth of microfinance has demonstrated nothing else, large numbers of low-income borrowers can be served while achieving a remarkably high level of repayment. Billions of dollars in loans to over one hundred million borrowers are outstanding, and data from top lenders show that only 2-3 percent of those are delinquent in recent years。

The industrial organization of microfinance and the broader banking sector has received little attention so far, but as central banks set the stage for the rapid expansion of“inclusive” banking, it becomes integral to understand how efforts to reach low-income and excluded populations relate to larger economic and financial contexts. The small scale of transactions means that microbanks tend to operate in niches which are littlepenetrated by mainstream commercial banks, though competition is emerging, especially with the increasing commercialization of microfinance. Economic theory suggests that a more developed banking sector can both help and hinder the profitability of microbanks.The balance rests largely with the relative strengths of positive spillovers from agglomeration effects and a stronger regulatory environment versus negative spillovers that arise as competition undermines the dynamic incentives at the root of microfinance loan contracts. Determining the balance is ultimately an empirical question. Our results show that the strongest impacts on microbanks of competition from the formal financial sector are on the nature of microbanking services and markets, rather than their profitability. Competition appears to drive microbanks toward niches characterized by smaller-scale loans (suggesting poorer customers) than would otherwise be the case.

To a large extent, competition has gone under-studied due to lack of data, regarding both the reach of formal (non-microbank) providers of financial services and the performance and outreach of microfinance institutions themselves. Recent improvements in the data on both fronts enable us to undertake our analysis. We build on Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007) which contains indicators of banking sector outreach for 99 countries that are constructed from aggregate data provided by bank regulators. The focus is on banks because they provide the vast majority of financial services in developing countries. As regulated institutions, their statistical information is relatively reliable and comparable across the sector.

We add measures of the number of bank branches, ATMs, and loan and deposit accounts to complement standard indicators of the depth and efficiency of financial systems, such as the ratio of private credit to GDP and net interest margins.4 The additional variables add potentially useful information (for example, the correlation between branches per square kilometer and the ratio of private credit to GDP is 0.44: strong but far from perfect). Firms report facing less severe financing obstacles in countries that score higher on the added measures of banking outreach, even when the level of private credit is controlled for in regressions (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria, 2007). We show that the added banking outreach measures are significantly associated with the profitability and outreach of microfinance institutions whereas other measures of banking sector development and efficiency are not.

Our primary goal is to offer evidence on the effects of competition on the profitability and outreach of microfinance institutions. By combining a new dataset on the performanc

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