Leval，Pierre N .达到合理使用标准外文翻译资料

Leval，Pierre N .达到合理使用标准

原文作者 Patricia Aufderheide

单位Communication Law and Policy

摘要：皮埃尔·莱瓦尔法官关于转化性在解释合理使用中的中心地位的评论决定性地改变了对版权原则的解释方式。他成功地利用该论坛完成了他在司法决策中未能完成的工作。

主要论点概述

1990年，在纽约担任了12年联邦初审法官的皮埃尔·莱瓦尔在极有影响力的《哈佛法律评论》上写了一篇长达29页的评论。这篇文章论述了合理使用的版权原则的解释，即在某些情况下未经许可或付费而重用版权材料的权利。在这份报告中，他认为，在没有明确的明线标准的情况下，法官使用的是导致混淆法律的特别推理。虽然这篇文章公开表示不同意其他法官的观点，但它是用外交手腕和讽刺的机智写成的。他和其他人一起指控自己以前遵循了一条关于合理使用的“无舵”推理道路。

他主张一个建立在理性概念基础上的理性规则

“变革性使用”——他创造的一个术语，用来描述为一个新的或不同的目的的重用。他写道，这将为法官提供一种解读1976年《版权法》改革编纂的四个因素的方法:新作品的性质、原作的性质、所用材料的数量或重要性以及对市场的影响。这将非常符合美国版权法宣称的宗旨，即鼓励创作公共教育作品。他驳斥了其他法律中的解释性论点，如隐私或盗窃。他从头到尾都回到了版权的功利目的，即为公共教育提供创作作品的激励，并警告不要剥夺作者的道德权利，这在美国是不存在的。

语境

莱瓦尔对眼前和长期的问题都做出了回应。在他的直接权限内，他发现他自己的论点在他收到的版权案件中是不一致的，他看到他级别以上的司法判决没有遵守一致的原则。高等法院不同意他自己的推理，这一事实不得不刺痛和发现，在高等法院以及他自己的判决中，推理缺乏依据，这当然是证明他们(以及他自己的)失败的一种方式。在塞林格诉兰登书屋案中，著名作家J.D .塞林格的传记引用了未出版的手稿。莱瓦尔发现是为了合理使用，但上诉法院——在他看来是错误的——转而关注手稿未出版的事实，并声称手稿受到特殊保护(这一判决后来在1992年被国会推翻)。然后，在一个关于L·罗恩·哈伯德传记的案例中，传记作者引用了日记条目，他再次发现合理使用，并再次被否决，在与未发表的材料有关的问题上。正如他在2015年美国大学的一次演讲中所说，“我站在法律的最前沿，扮演萨拉米香肠的角色。”莱瓦尔在他1990年的文章中指出，由于版权旨在传播作品并向公众提供，因此不应用于保护隐私——这方面还有其他法律。此外，版权允许审查的固有趋势受到忽视次要作品公共价值的决定的鼓励。

莱瓦尔也是在公平使用刚刚被编纂的时候写下他的开创性文章的。1976年的《版权法》改革在范围和规模上都极大地扩大了版权垄断；它还将1841年一项关于合理使用的法律决定中的语言引入了法律。突然间，合理使用比以前重要得多从那以后，越来越多的资料被版权保护的时间越来越长。更重要的是要有一个连贯一致的方法来进行合理使用分析——当然，随着互联网支持的数字通信的发展，这一点更加真实。

此外，法律中的法律经济学观点也已成为共识。这一观点源于罗纳德·科斯和圭多·卡拉布雷西的早期著作，认为法律应该发挥作用，允许通过自由市场有效分配价值。依赖狭隘的经济视角或有限的市场观念来证明法律职能的倾向，最终可能不适当地优先考虑第四个公平使用因素，即对市场的影响。这也可能导致这样一种争论，即只有在不可能获得许可的情况下，才可以进行合理使用。事实上，这种争论在今天还没有完全被取代。例如，美国第七巡回上诉法院——以其新自由主义、法律和经济学倾向而闻名——在2014年对公平使用分析采取了第四因素方法，公开质疑莱瓦利亚变革性使用方法的智慧，尽管这种方法现在是次要的。第七巡回法官理查德·波斯纳(Richard Posner)撰写了关于公平使用的狭义解释，成为莱瓦利亚尖锐(且有趣)批评的焦点。

莱瓦尔在他的法律评论文章中认为，合理使用是版权的功利功能的一部分，目的是为社会获得“从创造性努力中获得的智力和实践上的丰富”。合理使用是法律的一部分，它承认创造性的努力在某种意义上总是必然衍生的，“智力活动的重要领域[即哲学、批评，历史，自然科学]是明确的参考。“合理使用，简而言之，使公共知识成为可能，这是版权法的功利价值的核心。莱瓦尔进一步指出，优先考虑版权所有者的经济利益会杀死这只金鹅；就其极限而言，将合理使用限制在不会给版权所有者造成任何经济损失的情况下只会否定合理使用，因为它总是涉及不支付许可费。

在这篇文章冷静优雅的论点背后，有一种紧迫感。莱瓦尔认为，如果对合理使用的解释继续在临时的基础上拖累其他价值观和法律领域，就会对言论自由、创造性创新和版权法本身的效用构成威胁。

意义

莱瓦尔在1992年的一项司法裁决中迅速使用了自己的论点，他在裁决中引用了自己的文章。他认定德士古公司没有通过为员工复印科学期刊文章来合理使用，因为没有变革的目的。然后，1994年，戴维·苏特法官在坎贝尔诉阿科夫-罗斯音乐公司一案中为法院写作时，六次援引了莱瓦尔的核心变革论点，将这一决定建立在版权的宪法目的基础上。第二巡回法院继续在1994年验证了他的德士古公司的决定。这种方法很快成为默认方法，这可以从围绕娱乐产品的合理使用诉讼的前后分析中看出。在凯利诉阿里巴软件公司一案中，变革性是法院裁定阿里巴的搜索引擎可以在不侵权的情况下从网站上绘制缩略图的理由。杰弗·昆斯和理查德·普林斯以及其他坏男孩艺术家赢得了基于变革逻辑的判决。现在坐在第二巡回法庭的莱瓦尔继续在2015年的判决中运用他的核心逻辑，作者协会，Inc .，等人诉谷歌，一个经过仔细推理的论点谷歌展示片段对公众有益，但不会产生市场替代效应。

法律学者以莱瓦尔的见解为基础，记录了司法决策中变革性的解决方案。如今，地区法院和上诉法院都在判决中使用变革性使用范式，那些工作被发现具有变革性的被告更有可能获胜。莱瓦尔的文章也在学术文献中根深蒂固，引用了1，672篇关于谷歌学术的文章。

学者活动家和倡导者也抓住了变革性。Patricia Aufderheide和Peter Jaszi与十几个实践社区一起创建公平使用最佳实践守则的工作就是基于这一逻辑。电子前沿基金会和公共知识等公共利益组织已经将公平使用行动主义纳入其倡导议程，也使用了转化逻辑。这个名为“变革工作组织”的组织成立于2007年，是一个非营利的粉丝维权组织，代表着制作视频、模因、混音、混搭和其他重组作品的人们的利益。知识产权法律诊所大多设在大学，它们与实践社区(其中许多有最佳实践准则)合作，成功赢得了《数字千年版权法》中反规避规则的豁免。这些组织和努力有助于传达勒瓦尔在2017年11月的美国大学演讲中简洁地总结的内容:“评估合理使用不需要成为版权学者。人们只需要理解版权的目的。”

反光

莱瓦尔的作品是一篇独特的法律评论文章，前所未有，引人注目。它是由一位在任法官撰写的，旨在推广一种方法公平使用他在他的司法报告中开发和阐述的内容，解决版权法学的难题。它改变了法律。他突出了他的方法，这种方法可能永远不会被广泛采用，否则可能需要数年时间。它具有很强的战略性，并且充满了可引用的引语，这使得法庭更容易抓住主题。

帕特里夏·奥德海德

大学传播学院教授

美国大学

外文文献出处：Communication Law and Policy

附外文文献原文

Toward a Fair Use Standard

28 Jul 2020

Author：Patricia Aufderheide

Judge Pierre Levalrsquo;s commentary on the centrality of transformativeness in interpreting fair use decisively changed the way the copyright doctrine was interpreted. He leveraged the forum successfully to accomplish what he had been unable to accomplish thereto in judicial decision-making.

SUMMARY OF MAIN ARGUMENT

In 1990, Pierre Leval, who had served as a federal trial judge in New York for twelve years, wrote a twenty-nine-page commentary in the highly influential Harvard Law Review. The essay addressed the interpretation of the copyright doctrine of fair use, or the right to reuse copyrighted material without permission or payment under some circumstances. In it, he argued that in the absence of a clear bright-line standard, judges were using ad hoc reasoning that resulted in confusing law. Although the article openly disagreed with other judges, it was written with diplomacy and a wry wit. He charged himself, along with others, with previously following a “rudderless” path of reasoning about fair use.

He argued for a rule of reason anchored in the concept of “transformative use”— a term he coined to describe reuse for a new or different purpose. This, he wrote, would give judges a way to interpret the four factors that the 1976 Copyright Act reform codified: the nature of the new work, the nature of the original, the amount or importance of the material used, and effect on the market. It would fit nicely within the declared purpose of U.S. copyright law, to encourage creation of works for public education. He swatted down interpretative arguments that would drag in other law, such as privacy or theft. He returned throughout to copyrightrsquo;s utilitarian purpose of providing incentives for creation of work for public education, and warned against eliding it with authorsrsquo; moral rights, which do not exist in the United States.

CONTEXT

Leval was responding both to immediate and long-term concerns. In his immediate purview, he had found that his own arguments had been inconsistent in the copyright cases that had come to him, and he saw judicial decisions above his level fail to adhere to consistent principles. The fact that higher courts disagreed with his own reasoning had to sting and discovering a lack of grounding for the reasoning in the upper court decisions as well as his own was certainly a way to demonstrate their failure (as well as his own). In Salinger v. Random House, a biography of the famous author J.D. Salinger had quoted from unpublished manuscripts. Leval found for fair use, but the appeals c

剩余内容已隐藏，支付完成后下载完整资料

Toward a Fair Use Standard

28 Jul 2020

Author：Patricia Aufderheide

Judge Pierre Levalrsquo;s commentary on the centrality of transformativeness in interpreting fair use decisively changed the way the copyright doctrine was interpreted. He leveraged the forum successfully to accomplish what he had been unable to accomplish thereto in judicial decision-making.

SUMMARY OF MAIN ARGUMENT

In 1990, Pierre Leval, who had served as a federal trial judge in New York for twelve years, wrote a twenty-nine-page commentary in the highly influential Harvard Law Review. The essay addressed the interpretation of the copyright doctrine of fair use, or the right to reuse copyrighted material without permission or payment under some circumstances. In it, he argued that in the absence of a clear bright-line standard, judges were using ad hoc reasoning that resulted in confusing law. Although the article openly disagreed with other judges, it was written with diplomacy and a wry wit. He charged himself, along with others, with previously following a “rudderless” path of reasoning about fair use.

He argued for a rule of reason anchored in the concept of “transformative use”— a term he coined to describe reuse for a new or different purpose. This, he wrote, would give judges a way to interpret the four factors that the 1976 Copyright Act reform codified: the nature of the new work, the nature of the original, the amount or importance of the material used, and effect on the market. It would fit nicely within the declared purpose of U.S. copyright law, to encourage creation of works for public education. He swatted down interpretative arguments that would drag in other law, such as privacy or theft. He returned throughout to copyrightrsquo;s utilitarian purpose of providing incentives for creation of work for public education, and warned against eliding it with authorsrsquo; moral rights, which do not exist in the United States.

CONTEXT

Leval was responding both to immediate and long-term concerns. In his immediate purview, he had found that his own arguments had been inconsistent in the copyright cases that had come to him, and he saw judicial decisions above his level fail to adhere to consistent principles. The fact that higher courts disagreed with his own reasoning had to sting and discovering a lack of grounding for the reasoning in the upper court decisions as well as his own was certainly a way to demonstrate their failure (as well as his own). In Salinger v. Random House, a biography of the famous author J.D. Salinger had quoted from unpublished manuscripts. Leval found for fair use, but the appeals court–erroneously in his opinion– focused instead on the fact that the manuscripts were unpublished and asserted that manuscripts had special protection (a judgment later overturned by Congress in 1992). Then, in a case about a biography of L. Ron Hubbard in which the biographer quoted from diary entries, he again found for fair use and was overruled, again, on matters related to unpublished material. As he put it in a speech at American University in 2015, “I was at the cutting edge of law, in the role of the salami.” Leval argued in his 1990 article that since copyright was designed to circulate and make works available to the public, it should not be used to safeguard privacy — for which there was other law. Further, the inherent tendency of copyright to permit censorship was being encouraged by decisions that ignored the public value of the secondary works.

Leval was also writing his seminal article at a time when fair use had only recently been codified. The 1976 reform of the Copyright Act had vastly extended copyright monopolies in both scope and scale; it had also imported language from an 1841 legal decision on fair use into the law. Suddenly,fair use was far more important than it had ever been, since so much more material was copyrighted for so much longer. Much more was at stake in having a coherent and consistent approach to fair use analysis – and of course that was only truer as Internet-enabled digital communication grew.

As well, a law-and-economics perspective in law had become com-mon. This perspective, growing out of early writings by Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi, argued that the law should function to permit the efficient distribution of value through free markets. The tendency to rely on a narrow economic lens, or a limited idea of the marketplace, to justify legal functions could end up prioritizing the fourth fair use factor, effect on the market, unduly. It could also result in an argument that fair use was only available if no license was possible to obtain. Indeed, this argument is not entirely superseded today. For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit – which is noted for its neoliberal, law-and-economics bent – in 2014 took a fourth-factor approach to a fair use analysis that openly doubted the wisdom of a Levalian transformative-use approach, although such approaches are now minoritarian. Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner, who has written on narrow interpretations of fair use, became the focus of sharp (and funny) criticism from Leval.

Leval argued in his law review article that fair use was instead part of the utilitarian function of copyright to obtain for society the“intellectual and practical enrichment that results from creative endeavors.” Fair use was the part of the law that recognized that creative endeavors are always perforce derivative in some sense, and that “important areas of intellectual activity [that is, philosophy, criticism, history, natural sciences are explicitly referential.” Fair use, in short, enabled public knowledge, the utilitarian value at the heart of copyright law. Leval further noted that prioritizing economic interests of copyright holders would kill this golden goose; at its limit, limiting fair use only to situations when it would not cause any financia

剩余内容已隐藏，支付完成后下载完整资料

资料编号：[596817]，资料为PDF文档或Word文档，PDF文档可免费转换为Word