爱的法则:打妻子是特权和隐私

原文作者 Reva b Siegelt

摘要：家庭暴力的持续存在提出了有关废除惩罚特权的法律改革性质的重要问题。通过研究在国家剥夺了男性殴打妻子的权利后，对婚姻暴力的监管是如何演变的，我们可以了解到民权改革是如何改变一套地位法的。在19世纪和20世纪，美国女权运动试图改革婚姻法，以确保妻子与丈夫享有平等权利。它在每个世纪的努力都使婚姻法发生了重大变化。已婚妇女的地位有所提高，但如果我们把平等衡量为权势和物质财富，或者她们所做的工作，或者她们享受的身体安全程度，那么她们与丈夫之间的平等仍然没有实现。尽管女权主义运动作出了努力，法律制度在使这些地位差异永存方面继续发挥着重要作用，尽管随着时间的推移，法律在加强地位关系方面所起的作用已变得越来越不明显。

关键词：婚姻法； 家庭暴力；

国家对丈夫提出了殴打妻子的刑事起诉，而已婚妇女本人则提出了侵权索赔。一个被虐待的妻子可以起诉她的丈夫以证明她自己的伤害而不依赖于国家的干预和保护吗?这个问题让那些熟悉普通法对婚姻的理解的人感到吃惊。普通法赋予丈夫惩罚妻子的特权，同时也剥夺了已婚妇女提起诉讼的权利，未经丈夫同意而提起诉讼。配偶间的诉讼违反了婚姻统一原则的基本原则。
但如果妻子起诉丈夫的前景违背最基本的普通法婚姻的概念,这也是常见的法律改革的必然产物,在十九世纪中期,率先提出的一个时期婚姻原则统一接受法定修改女权主义者倡导的压力下。被要求判定殴打妻子是否为侵权行为的法院必须解释已婚妇女的财产法，妇女权利运动曾倡导该法的制定。在这些法律赋予已婚妇女的许多权利中，有在没有丈夫共同参与的情况下提起诉讼的权利，以及因人身和财产受到伤害而获得侵权损害赔偿的权利。根据这些改革法规，妻子现在可以对侵犯她的丈夫提起侵权诉讼并要求金钱赔偿吗?这个问题让女性从双重意义上为自己辩护:原告在没有依靠国家保护的情况下寻求赔偿，以及她这样做是根据响应女权主义宣传而颁布的立法。

侵权行为法不同于刑法的另一个方面与我们对现代家暴法发展的分析有关。妻子只有在有财产可以在家庭内部重新分配的情况下，才有可能对侵犯她的丈夫提起金钱赔偿诉讼。因此，正如法学家肯定会认识到的那样，中产阶级和上层阶级的已婚男子可能面临为妻子提出的侵权索赔。

纽约法院是第一个面对这个问题的。1860年，纽约颁布了一项全国知名的法律，赋予已婚妇女对自己收入的权利，以及在合同和侵权行为中提起诉讼的权利，包括“提出hellip;hellip;以她自己的名义提起诉讼，要求损害赔偿，针对任何人或法人团体，如对其人身或品格有任何伤害，应视其为独资。几年后，一位已婚妇女以殴打罪起诉她的丈夫，纽约最高法院解释说，1860年的法令禁止了她的主张。虽然一审法院认为“被告殴打并殴打原告，使其损失100美元”，但复审法院在上诉中推翻了这一判决。法院承认，妻子起诉丈夫侵犯和殴打的权利“可能在[法规]的字面语言下被涵盖”，但抱怨这可能不是“立法机关的含义和意图，而且hellip;hellip;不应该是对这一行为的解释。

纽约的这起案件是一系列判决中的第一起，这些判决允许丈夫免受其妻子可能对其提起的侵权诉讼。正如我们将看到的，它关于此类诉讼将“播下永久家庭纠纷的种子”的主张，加上北卡罗莱纳州法院发展的基于隐私的刑事豁免理论，成为配偶间侵权豁免的紧急学说的标准理由。在1877年的一桩侵权案件中，缅因州最高法院是最早将“家庭和谐”和“隐私”理论综合起来的法院之一。年雅培诉雅培,女人在侵权起诉她的前夫,声称他猛烈地攻击她,和恶意原因她强行绑架,放在铁,并被关在精神病院,她被“囚禁一个疯狂的人在很长一段时间对她将和她的健康的伤害和安慰。”缅因州法院裁定原告不能从她的前夫那里获得侵权损害赔偿。法院承认,“多年来逐步进化的法律,改进的已婚妇女的病情,直到现在,毫无疑问,英格兰和美国所有的州的法律,丈夫没有罢工权他的妻子,为了惩罚她,在任何情况下或任何挑衅行为下。”然而，在否定了受惩罚的权利之后，法院又宣布丈夫对其妻子施暴免除侵权责任。为了支持这一观点，法院引用了北卡罗来纳州最高法院的一份意见，解释了为什么丈夫应该免受殴打妻子的刑事起诉:“最好拉上窗帘，避开公众的视线，让双方忘记和原谅。”法院认为，侵权救济是“不可取的”，因为妻子可以在刑事法庭寻求救济，或以残忍为由寻求离婚，法院认为“法律将是一个糟糕的政策，给予在本案中所要求的救济，”因为“整个婚姻存在时期的私人事务可能会被诉讼揭露”，而且“这将增加一种掠夺财产的新方法。”

美国最高法院在1910年解释哥伦比亚特区已婚妇女财产法案时，援引了“隐私”和“家庭和谐”两种理由来解释配偶间侵权豁免。176 .法院声称，国会并未打算给予配偶这种权利。当它提供“[m]已婚女性应该拥有权力hellip;hellip;单独起诉hellip;hellip;侵权对他们承诺,充分和自由就像未婚”;177年,然后观察到允许intramarital套装将“打开车门,法庭指控各种对另一方,并纳入公告投诉攻击,诽谤,诽谤,”并质疑“行使这种管辖权是否会促进公共福利和家庭和谐。”到20世纪早期，许多州的最高法院已经禁止妻子以故意侵权为由起诉丈夫——典型的理由是“家庭关系的平静”会“受到干扰”。

英美习惯法最初规定，丈夫作为家庭的主人，可以对妻子进行体罚或“惩罚”，只要他没有对妻子造成永久性的伤害。译文:在十九世纪，一个要求改革婚姻法的女权运动的时代，英国和美国当局宣布丈夫不再有惩罚妻子的权利。然而，在法庭否认惩罚的权利一个世纪之后，美国的法律体系仍然将殴打妻子与其他人身攻击和殴打案件区别对待。虽然当局否认丈夫有权殴打妻子，但他们只是间断性地干预婚姻暴力案件:男人殴打自己的妻子经常被授予正式和非正式的豁免起诉,为了保护家庭的隐私,促进“国内和谐卢在1970年代末,女权运动开始挑战家庭隐私保护妻子滥用的概念,并从那时起,它已经完成了许多旨在保护妇女免受婚姻暴力的改革。然而，家庭暴力依然存在。美国卫生局局长最近发现，“丈夫、前夫或情人对女性的殴打是美国女性受伤的最大单一原因。”

“在美国，被谋杀的女性中有百分之三十一是被她们的丈夫、前夫或情人杀害的。”6

家庭暴力的持续存在提出了有关废除惩罚特权的法律改革性质的重要问题。通过研究在国家剥夺了男性殴打妻子的权利后，对婚姻暴力的监管是如何演变的，我们可以了解到民权改革是如何改变一套地位法的。在19世纪和20世纪，美国女权运动试图改革婚姻法，以确保妻子与丈夫享有平等权利。它在每个世纪的努力都使婚姻法发生了重大变化。已婚妇女的地位有所提高，但如果我们把平等衡量为权势和物质财富，或者她们所做的工作，或者她们享受的身体安全程度，那么她们与丈夫之间的平等仍然没有实现。尽管女权主义运动作出了努力，法律制度在使这些地位差异永存方面继续发挥着重要作用，尽管随着时间的推移，法律在加强地位关系方面所起的作用已变得越来越不明显。

正如本文将展示的那样，改革地位制度的努力确实会带来改变，但并不总是倡导者所寻求的那种改变。当地位制度的合法性受到成功的质疑时，立法者和法学家将放弃和捍卫地位特权，逐渐放弃被质疑的制度的原有规则和正当言辞，并寻找新的规则和理由来保护他们选择捍卫的地位特权。因此，民权改革可以通过向法律精英施压，将其转化为更现代、更少争议的社会习惯用语，为地位法注入新的生命。7我所说的这种变化状态的规则和修辞政权“通过转换、保存”,说明这个现代化动态在国内侵犯的案例研究法律进化规则结构和原理从婚姻的法律特权的法律婚姻的隐私。

根据旧法律，丈夫可以适当地纠正妻子。但是白纸黑字规定，男人不能把女人打得青一块紫一块的，虽然民法上说，男人得到女人的手以后，可以自由地向她挥拳。重视普通法的普通人仍然享有打妻子的特权。

而一个生活在社会底层的女人，如果她爱上了一个男人，在结婚之后，就有可能被他殴打一顿。

直到19世纪晚期，英美普通法规定婚姻关系中丈夫比妻子在大多数方面优越。根据法律，丈夫获得了对妻子的人身权利、她有偿或无偿劳动的价值以及她为婚姻带来的大部分财产的权利。妻子有义务服从并为丈夫服务，丈夫也有义务在法律制度内支持妻子并代表她。根据婚姻统一的原则，妻子的法律身份与丈夫的“合并”，因此在没有丈夫参与的情况下，她无法提起诉讼，无论是执行合同还是寻求损害赔偿。

随着时间的推移，美国的法律体系确实对这些殴打妻子的批评做出了回应。几十年来，禁酒和女权倡导者的抗议，加上人们对体罚态度的转变，以及性别道德观念的改变，共同使关于婚姻惩罚的法律受到质疑。到19世纪70年代，美国没有法官或论文作者承认丈夫有权惩罚妻子。因此，当殴打妻子的人被指控殴打和殴打时，法官拒绝考虑他关于丈夫有殴打妻子的合法权利的主张;相反,他们谴责了这种特权，并允许进行刑事起诉。44 .在几个州，立法机关颁布了专门禁止殴打妻子的法规;有三个州甚至恢复了对这一罪行的体罚，规定殴打妻子者可被判处鞭刑。

外文文献出处：The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy

While it was clear by the second half of the nineteenth century that wife

beating was a crime, it was not at all clear that this same conduct constituted

a tort. A criminal prosecution for wife beating was brought against a husband by the state, while a tort claim was prosecuted by the married woman herself. Could a battered wife bring suit against her husband in order to vindicate her own injuries without depending upon the state to intervene and protect her? The question was startling to those versed in common law understandings of marriage. The same body of common law that vested a husband with the prerogative to chastise his wife also denied married woman the right to file suit without her husbands consent and joinder.160 Interspousal litigation violated fundamental precepts of the doctrine of marital unity.

But if the prospect of a wife suing her husband contravened the most basic common law concepts of marriage, it was also an inevitable outgrowth of common law reform in the mid-nineteenth century a period when the doctrine of marital unity was undergoing statutory modification under the pressure of feminist advocacy. Courts asked to determine whether wife beating was a tort had to interpret the married womens property acts whose enactment the womans rights movement had advocated. Among the many rights these laws gave married women was the right to file suit without their husbandsjoinder, and the right to collect tort damages for injuries to their persons and property.161 Under these reform statutes, could a wife now bring a tort suit against a husband who assaulted her and collect money damages? The question presented women as agents of their own vindication in a dual sense: A plaintiff sought redress for her injury without relying on the state to protect her, and

she did so under the authority of legislation enacted in response to feminist advocacy.162

The law of torts differed from the criminal law in one other respect relevant to our analysis of the development of mod

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'The Rule of Love': Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy

Reva B. Siegelt

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 2118

1. NINETEENTH-CENTURY ABOLffiON OF

MARITAL CHASTISEMENT. 2121

The Right of Chastisement and Its Critics. 2122

• 1. Formal Repudiation of the Right of Chastisement. 2129

Relieffor Battered Wives: Separation and Divorce. 2130

• • 1. Race and Class Bias in the Criminal Prosecution of

W矿e Beaters. 2134

1. REGULATING MARITAL VIOLENCE IN AN ERA OF

COMPANIONATE MARRIAGE. 2142

1. THE DISCOURSE OF AFFECTIVE PRIVACY IN DOMESTIC

ASSAULT LAW. 2150

Marital Violence and Marital Privacy in

the Criminal Law. 2154

Affective Privacy in the Emerging Law of Interspousal

Tort Immunity. 2161

A Brief Reprise: Marital Privacy in the Criminal Law

。

if the Twentieth Century. 2170

t Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Bruce Ackennan and Robert Post and many other friends and colleagues who commented on the manuscript in its various stages of development: Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, Hugh Baxter, James Boyle, Mary Anne Case, Nancy Cott, William Eskridge, Thomas Ferraro, Owen Fiss, Paul Gewirtz, Sally Goldfarb, Julie Goldscheid, Robert Gordon, Anthony Kronman, Lawrence Lessig, Martha Minow, Victoria Nourse, Lisa Orsaba, Joel Paul, Joel Pfister, Milton Regan, Judith Resnik, Dorothy Roberts, Austin Sarai, Derick Schilling, William Treanor, Lea VanderVelde, Laura Wexler, Joan Villiams, and participants in faculty workshops at the Yale Law School, Harvard Law School, and American College of Law. In writing this Article, I was fortunate to have the assistance of Lisa Cardyn, who devoted many hours of research to the project and was always willing to engage the critical premises of my argument; Johanna Shargel and Catherine Lhamon also contributed significant research support.

2117

1. CIVIL RIGHTS REFORM AND THE MODERNIZATION OF

STATUS DISCOURSE. 2174

• 1. Historical Perspectives. 2175
  2. Contemporary Perspectives. 2188
  3. Discourses of Affective Privacy Today: Interpreting the

Violence Against Women Act. 2196

• • 1. VAWAs Civil Rights Remedy for

Gender-Motivated Violence. 2197

• • 1. VAWA: Rule of Love Redux. 2200

CONCLUSION. 2206

INTRODUCTION

The Anglo-American common law originally provided that a husband, as master of his household, could subject his wife to corporal punishment or 'chastisement' so long as he did not inflict permanent injury upon her.1 During the nineteenth century, an era of feminist agitation for reform of marriage law, authorities in England and the United States declared that a husband no longer had the right to chastise his wife.2 Yet, for a century after courts repudiated the right of chastisement, the American legal system continued to treat wife beating differently from other cases of assault and battery. While authorities denied that a husband had the right to beat his wife, they intervened only intermittently in cases of marital violence: Men who assaulted their wives were often granted formal and informal immunities from prosecution, in order to protect the privacy of the family and to promote 'domestic harmony 卢 In the late 1970s, the feminist movement began to challenge the concept of family privacy that shielded wife abuse, and since then, it has secured many reforms designed to protect women from marital violence.4 Yet violence in the household persists. The U.S. Surgeon General recently found that 'battering of women by husbands, ex-husbands or lovers [is] the single largest cause of injury to women in the United States.'5

1. See infra Section I.A.

1. See infra Section I.B. For some accounts of law reform in England during the late nineteenth century, see A. JAMES HAMMERTON, CRUELTY AND COMPANIONSHIP: CONFLICT IN

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